

Serious and Organised Crime



EMPOWER
SAFER IN PARTNERSHIP

Our local profile
Hampshire Districts

Working in partnership to deliver safer communities in Hampshire

Serious and organised crime (SOC) affects us all, no matter which agency we work for, because it affects our communities and those we work with and for.

Criminals involved in SOC tend to employ specialist skills and have a level of sophistication and co-ordination that makes the level of harm caused more extensive and they are also far more resilient to any intervention.

A co-ordinated, multi-agency approach that combines all of our specialist skills is perhaps the single most devastating tool we have in the fight against organised crime.

Summary

This document has been prepared to give your organisation insight into the extent, threat, harm and other issues surrounding SOC. It has been put together by Hampshire Constabulary's operational analysis team based on data the financial year 2018 – 2019.

We are sharing this information to help all partners understand the full picture, ensuring we are better placed to tackle SOC together. Please take the time to read through this document and if you have any questions please get in touch with the Analysis in Hampshire Constabulary.

Key areas that this document covers:

- Identifying the scale of the issue. Given the complexity of SOC we need your help in identifying it within your area of work; knowing how to either signpost people to reporting or directly reporting yourself.
- Focusing on the highest harm. High harm crimes - such as rape - occur in private spaces so we recognise that partners (other than the police) may have better access to, and knowledge of, victims and vulnerable spaces.
- Identifying high harm offenders and high risk victims. Organised crime groups (OCGs) present a significant threat to our communities, so identifying those people who are linked (either as an offender or victim) represents a significant part of our partnership approach.
- Setting out our partnership approach. The final section looks at a structured approach for us to tackle this issue together.



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
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1. Overview

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) affects more people in the UK, more often, than any other national security threat.


Figure 1: the impact of SOC



The diverse nature and scale of organised crime presents a complex and evolving threat, which therefore requires a structured response to disrupt, safeguard and prevent.

The financial cost of SOC does not by itself capture the diverse range of harm caused to those affected, and as the threat evolves, SOC impacts a broader range of victims. The harm caused is often hidden within communities, and the signs and symptoms of its manifestation are vast. Harm impacts individuals, businesses and/or societies, and this can have long-term damaging outcomes. These outcomes range from a risk of crime, personal health, social inclusion and/or integration. In order to effectively identify and safeguard those exposed to harm or exhibiting these signs, symptoms and vulnerabilities, a combined society level response is required.

Figure 2: Indicators of the scale and scope of SOC threats.



Evidence shows that SOC threats are increasingly interlinked, and poly-criminality remains a key feature of the SOC landscape. The criminal activities linked to these groups is often perpetrated simultaneously and involves primary and secondary activities.

Table 1: Primary and secondary criminal activities

Types of activities	Characteristics	Examples include
Primary activities	Generate profit directly	Drug related crime or servitude
Secondary activities	Not directly profitable themselves but support their work and maintain their influence and profile	Violence, corruption


These activities have a significant impact upon communities and so understanding how the public perceive SOC is important to knowing how best to tackle it. Given the diverse and far reaching harms associated with SOC, it is important that the public and partners are able to identify SOC in their area and to report it. Having an understanding of public perceptions helps to ensure that we have a reliable sense of the problem. If this is not gained, agencies may be tackling a problem that has been defined with inherited conceptions and definitions, which may not match with lived experience.

2. Recognising Harm

Harm is defined as ***‘the ill-treatment or impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another’***. This could relate to physical or mental health, and/or physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development.

The adoption of a harm approach in Hampshire and the IOW has assisted the police force in understanding and preparing for its evolving crime profile and demand.

For example these areas have seen the following increases in harm since July 2016:

Residential burglary, 41% 

Possession of weapons, 27% 

Robbery of personal property, 26% 

As the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau reports significant increases in instances of *fraud*, the force and partnership will need to continue to prioritise and tailor its response to high harm offences and the associated victims.

Figure 3: Crime Severity across Hampshire & IOW

District	Crime severity score
Basingstoke and Deane	1,963,081
East Hampshire	909,586
Eastleigh	1,254,186
Fareham	1,006,712
Gosport	1,070,661
Hart	612,023
Havant	1,606,781
Isle of Wight	1,458,550
New Forest	1,638,263
Portsmouth	3,842,440
Rushmoor	1,270,009
Southampton	5,049,480
Test Valley	1,210,587
Winchester	1,208,576
Grand Total	24,437,456

Utilising a Crime Severity measure Hampshire and the Isle of Wight has been identified as a ‘high harm’ county. When compared to its most similar seven police forces, Hampshire notes the second highest volume and severity of offences per 1,000 of the population.

While improved crime recording and public confidence may account for an increase in reporting of high severity offences, it is not believed to be wholly attributable for Hampshire’s ‘high harm’ status. This is because while harm has increased in severity (+4%), the volume of crime is falling (-1%) when compared to the same period last year.

The District noting the highest severity of offences is Southampton, followed by Portsmouth and Basingstoke (see figure 3).



The harm approach has also improved risk assessments, resource allocation and accountability, as it considers both the volume and severity of offences, which do not always correlate. This discrepancy is evident from figure 4 (below), which suggests that whilst rape accounts for less than 1% of all crime in Hampshire and the IOW, it causes 31% of all harm reported, and poses the most significant threat.

Working in partnership to tackle high harm

As 71% of rape and 73% of other high harm offences occur within private spaces, we recognise that non-law enforcement practitioners may have better access to, and knowledge of, vulnerable premises and victims.

Sharing this information via partnership is critical in tackling this threat.

Thorough risk assessments are key to better understanding of the problem so we can tackle it together. In order to ensure that the partnership can complete thorough risk assessments, which consider all the factors of an individuals' life and current circumstance, it must continue to enhance its information sharing capabilities.

This capability looks to be further improved through:



The revision of Community Partnership Information (CPI) forms




The introduction of an app for intelligence submissions and



The review of referral pathways to the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH)

To help make information sharing quicker and easier. Clarity around what information can be shared, and with whom, should form part of ongoing dialogue between agencies.

Figure 4: Crime severity vs. crime volume, July 2018 - June 2019




When population data is considered alongside severity and volume, the picture of threat changes significantly (see figure 5). This perspective prevents police resourcing being skewed by locations where significant high volume, low harm crimes are occurring (e.g. city centres) and identifies the following wards as high harm locations:

Table 2: Highest harm locations in Hampshire and IOW

Location	% of all harm reported in Hampshire and IOW	Greatest harm threats
Bargate, Southampton	5%	Violence without injury (17%) and shoplifting (16%)
Charles Dickens, Portsmouth	4%	Violence without injury (23%) and violence with injury (18%)
Eastrop, Basingstoke	1%	Shoplifting (16%), violence without injury (15%) and violence with injury (14%)
Owslebury & Curdrige, Winchester	Less than 1%	Violence without injury (32%) and other sexual offences (14%)
Frogmore & Darby Green, Hart	Less than 1%	Violence with injury (22%) and violence without injury (19%)
Crondall, Hart	Less than 1%	Violence without injury (32%) and criminal damage (18%)

Figure 5: Crime severity volume vs. Crime severity per 1,000 of population




3. Organised Crime Groups

There are opportunities to be realised by the partnership relating to existing high harm offenders and victims¹ (see right). With 6% of victims experiencing 74% of harm and 4% of offenders causing 45% of harm within Hampshire and the IOW, the partnership is presented with an opportunity to maximise its impact against Serious and Organised Crime and protect the most vulnerable.

Partnership and high harm

We have an opportunity to work together to identify high harm offenders and victims. For instance children's services or schools find out information through linked family (either to an offender or victim). Sharing that information via our partnership helps to build a richer picture of where we need to target our efforts most.

Those known to be posing significant harm to our communities are Organised Crime Groups (OCGs).



Despite noting a 10% (-4) reduction in the number of OCGs operating in Hampshire, a 51% increase (137 to 207) in nominals linked to OCGs in 2018, suggests their networks are expanding. 26% (10) of these OCGs are also believed to be operating outside of the UK in over 12 countries. This evidences their global 'reach' and the complexity of their business models.

OCGs within Hampshire are often linked to drug activity; in 2018/19 25 of the 38 had a primary crime type of *drug trafficking*, most (22) of these were trafficking powder cocaine. In contrast to this, organised 'County Line' drug networks (discussed further below) are typically linked to the supply and distribution of crack cocaine and heroin.

The ratio of crimes linked² to OCG nominals in Hampshire has increased slightly, whilst the ratio of intelligence has fallen. 22% of crimes and 34% of intelligence reports linked to OCG activity relate to 13 specific OCG nominals. This presents the partnership with an opportunity to adopt a more focused approach on those nominals who present an enduring threat.

¹ These individuals may form part of OCGs or be victims of OCG activity.

² Linked as 'arrested' or 'suspect'



3.1 OCG partnership management case studies

1. OCG Sonar tackled child sexual exploitation linked to fast food establishments and their employees and associates. The operation involved partner agencies working together to assess the risk to victims, the threat from offenders and key locations to target. Working in partnership increased the range of powers and activities that could be utilised to protect victims, and target offenders and premises:

- Potential victims and suspects were assessed by police and partners and were then managed by the Missing Exploited & Trafficked (MET) Team, Willow Team, SDAS or MOTIV8.
- Childrens Services safeguarded a vulnerable 16 year old by obtaining an Emergency Protection Order and arranging a temporary placement away from home when a member of the OCG attempted to take them out of the county. This facilitated Hampshire Constabulary serving the OCG member with a Child Abduction Warning Notice (CAWN); subsequently they were convicted of conspiracy to supply controlled drugs and received a 5 year prison sentence.
- A Day of Action with Hampshire Constabulary, Immigration, HMRC and Licensing resulted in - the identification of Immigration offences; an arrest for impairment; a Fire Improvement Notice being served; a review of a Late Night Licence; and the serving of a Community Protection Notice.
- SDAS and Motiv8 delivered a prevention engagement strategy at key locations relevant to victims, supported by the Neighbourhood Police Team, MET Team and the Willow Team.

2. OCG Talon related to a 'County Line' drug network who were exploiting local young people. OCG members were using threats, violence, status and the promise of financial rewards to coerce the youths to run drugs on their behalf. Partnership activity focused on a law enforcement response to disrupt the network and safeguarding of the young people to mitigate the risk of exploitation.

- All subjects were assessed, with the most vulnerable allocated an 'owner' from the NPT and an Independent Child Trafficking Advocate (ICTA) from Barnado's.
- The OCG Lead Responsible Officer met with Childrens Services, the Youth Offending Team and the Willow Team to agree a partnership structure to manage these and similar cases as part of core business. Catch 22, Safer North Hampshire and local schools were also engaged.
- Childrens Services held monthly meetings to discuss case management of juveniles vulnerable to exploitation, and to ensure this was linked to the Safer North Hampshire CSP Vulnerabilities Operational Group.
- Following NRM assessment six children were considered to be victims (or potential victims) of trafficking/modern day slavery.
- The proactive response and safeguarding of youths made it a difficult environment for the county line to continue to operate using vulnerable children to sell drugs for them. Intelligence indicated that the youths were 'too hot to handle'.



4. Hampshire Local Authority Area

Over half (56%; 13,750,464) of the forces harm occurs in the Hampshire Local Authority Area (LAA). The highest harm threat occurring in all of these districts, excluding the New Forest, is sexual offending. These are particularly prominent in Basingstoke and Havant. Within the New Forest, *theft* offences pose the most significant threat, namely *vehicle offences*, *shoplifting* and *residential burglaries*. The majority of this harm in Hampshire is caused by acquaintances (19%) or strangers (18%).



The following sections refer to organised crime specifically within the Districts of the Hampshire LAA. Other areas may be referred to for context.



4.1 Child Sexual and/or Criminal Exploitation (CSE &/or CCE)

CSE continues to be an area of high risk and the focus of both investigative and safeguarding activity. The top three Districts where children at risk of CSE reside are Portsmouth, Southampton and Havant. The most common age of a child flagged at risk of CSE is 15; 82% are female and the vast majority (where recorded) are white.

Nine districts across Hampshire and the IOW have seen an increase in CSE crime in 2018, most notably Portsmouth, Basingstoke and Eastleigh. Whilst CSE crimes have increased, the number of children flagged as medium or high risk of CSE fell in 2018 – this reduction is linked to activity undertaken in partnership with Hampshire’s Missing, Exploited and Trafficked Team.

Safeguarding and operational activity regularly reveals correlations between children flagged at risk of CSE and/or CCE and Organised Crime Groups who supply and distribute controlled drugs. The exploitation of juveniles by transient drugs networks, predominantly as drug runners, is recognised nationally as an increasing threat³, and the escalation of this threat is reflected in Hampshire. In 2017/18, 5% of (667) known/suspected transient drug dealers stop-checked or arrested in Hampshire were juveniles; during the period March 2018 to Feb 2019, this number had grown substantially to 16% (of 627). Within Basingstoke, the percentage of out of force juvenile runners was even higher, with 23% of known/suspected transient drug dealers arrested or stopped over the same period being juveniles at the time of the occurrence⁴.

Intelligence relating to transient juveniles being utilised by drug networks is increasing; this is possibly due to improved awareness and information sharing. In 2019 Operation Lynx in the Test Valley area was an investigation relating to local young people who were being utilised by multiple drug networks, both local and transient, to deal drugs both in force and out of force. Offences of drug supply, child criminal exploitation and modern slavery were investigated. Between April 2018 and March 2019 Hampshire referred 63 individuals to the National Referral Mechanism for Modern Slavery, all of which were for Child Criminal Exploitation within County Lines.

³ NAC(18)087 ‘County Lines Drug Supply, Vulnerability and Harm 2018’ – NCA, December 2018

⁴ County Lines Impact - Basingstoke, Southampton and Portsmouth Districts. 14/03/2019 15518





4.2 Use of Weapons: Knives and Firearms

Focused upon serious violence and bladed article occurrences, analysis in support of an Op Sceptre Week of Action in 2018⁵ revealed that the city/town areas of Southampton, Portsmouth and Basingstoke were key locations for knife crimes. These findings are broadly consistent with policing deployment patterns - where it could

be anticipated that 'possession' offences would be identified - and demographic hot spots. These areas also correlate with other high harm issues, such as child related vulnerability and drug dealing activity/violence.

The criminal use of firearms remains low in Hampshire, however there are links to (typically) drug related County Line and/or OCG activity. Information in Basingstoke suggested that County Lines were 'actively' trying to source firearms from the local area, however risk assessments determined that there was no viable intelligence to suggest that firearms could be sourced locally. This is typical of the information received, where firearms are suggested to be accessible, rather than present or used in Hampshire.



4.3 Drug related organised crime

The threat posed by drug related harm, specifically County Lines, has been identified as a significant and cross cutting threat in Hampshire and the IOW. County Line offenders remain highly adaptable in their operating methods. Encouraged by profit, this drives changes to the threat as offenders seek to minimise the risk. Their business model continues to rely on targeting a broad

profile of vulnerable individuals to facilitate drug supply at a local level. There is continued associated risk of serious injury and loss of life, with drug users, runners and other exploited vulnerable individuals. To a lesser extent, violence is also identified as a result of tensions between competing groups.

Basingstoke recorded the greatest number of County Line networks and the highest number of violent drug-related harm incidents within the Hampshire LAA. Proximity to and ease of travel to and from London, coupled with an existing Class A market, are drivers for this level of drug-related activity. Despite this, drug related violence has decreased within Basingstoke, likely as a consequence of a dedicated response to County Line activity.

The collaboration of multiple agencies has resulted in the disruption of 400 lines, 1800 arrests, 131 NRM referrals and engagement with over 2000 vulnerable children and adults nationally which has mitigated the threat to the public. However, County Lines continue to demand a 'whole system' response across law enforcement, government agencies, charities, academia and the private sector.

⁵ [Knife Crime Profile](#)





4.4 Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking

Partnership activity has resulted in an increase in the number of reported crimes of Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT). Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE) and Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) incidents have increased more than other types of MSHT, however this is likely due to a raised awareness and understanding of these types of exploitation, which has subsequently driven operational activity. Offences of adult sexual exploitation, in the form of forced prostitution/off-street sex working, and labour exploitation linked to car-washes, have also been investigated.

All Districts within the LAA submit information on modern slavery and human trafficking, however reports decreased in 2018/19 and Community Partnership Information forms (CPI's) accounted for only a small amount of the information received. Given the role that partnership play in the identification of modern slavery, an objective of this report and the partnership should be to increase these submissions. Many more submissions come from educational establishments, which again supports the increase in CCE and CSE reports.

5. Vulnerability within communities

'A person is vulnerable if, as a result of their situation or circumstances, they are unable to take care of or protect themselves or others from harm or exploitation.'

The harm associated with SOC has a disproportionate effect on those who are vulnerable within communities. This vulnerability can take many forms and may include one or more of the following; mental health, age, race, religion, deprivation, financial or social status, and/or Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). The safeguarding needs and risk indicators associated with an individuals' vulnerability can be considerable; these individuals are therefore likely to come into contact, require the services and place variable demand on a range of agencies across their lifetime. While creating demand that a combined response could reduce going forward, these interactions simultaneously generate opportunities for intervention and a source of information and intelligence.

5.1 Age and vulnerability

A review of harm by age group suggests that, within Hampshire and the IOW, 21% of all harm in the county occurs against those aged 10-24. This is predominantly due to this age group being linked as victims of *rape, other sexual offences and violence with injury* offences. With juvenile offenders who are previously linked to 11 or more serious offences also having a higher reoffending rate (77%) than those with no previous offences (23%)⁶, this high risk group require early safeguarding interventions to prevent and/or protect them from being victims or perpetrators of harm.

One quarter (25) of Hampshire's OCG nominals are a parent to a child under the age of 18. These 25 nominals are linked to approximately one third (12) of the OCGs operating locally. Four of these 25 OCG nominals have been identified as a 'principal' OCG member, 14 as a 'significant' OCG member, and six as a 'peripheral' OCG member. The safeguarding of the 41 children linked to these 25 OCG nominals should be prioritised by the partnership. As effective safeguarding procedures are reliant on a comprehensive picture of the threat/risks being known, information sharing between all those whom have come into contact with the family is essential. The importance of this exchange of information has been reinforced by a number of recent serious case reviews.


⁶https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/702789/proven_reoffending_bulletin_April_to_June_16.pdf



5.2 ACE factors


National research suggests that children displaying behaviours associated with trauma, poor well-being and whom are placing themselves at risk, are at greater risk of harm and exploitation. ACEs have also been found to contribute to a broad spectrum of health challenges, including physical, behavioural and mental health issues across the individuals' lifespan and, because of their prevalence, constitute a significant public health issue. Figure 6 (below) details these ACE indicators and describes how they contribute to impairments, behaviours and problems through the course of an individuals' life.

Figure 6: ACE indicators and their impact



Analysis of police data has identified a number of common ACEs among children at risk of multiple forms of exploitation and abuse (see figure 7). It has also revealed positive correlations between the frequency of children going missing and increased vulnerability and links to criminality. Although these findings do not depict an accurate picture of child vulnerability in Hampshire and the IOW, as they rely solely on police data, they do provide the partnership with an opportunity to protect a highly vulnerable group. They also highlight the need to interrogate partnership information on those exhibiting some ACE indicators to determine whether they also meet the high risk threshold. The research referenced above suggests that the adoption of a 'whole-system' approach to protect those presenting four or more ACEs is likely to be mutually beneficial to a range of organisations and agencies.

Figure 7: The prevalence of ACEs in Hampshire and the IOW




A pilot launched in Portsmouth in December 2018, to educate social services and front-line responders to recognise the signs of ACEs denotes the forces increased drive around ACEs. The force is also currently working with partners across the force area to develop options for greater integrated work in this area, including how to improve and mainstream the identification of ACEs, and the introduction of Early Intervention Hubs. In order to manage down future demand and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector spending for high cost families, intensive support is also required for families with multiple, complex and persistent issues. To identify, safeguard and increase the resilience of these families, and to prevent long-term and damaging outcomes, effective early multi-agency intervention and engagement is required.

6. A Whole System Approach

In order to effectively prevent SOC, the partnership must have a clear understanding of how SOC manifests and the signs, symptoms and vulnerabilities associated with its presence in communities. Whilst there is no single pathway into SOC, figure 8 (below) provides a depiction of how an individual may become involved in SOC, as either or both a perpetrator and/or victim. It also outlines the corresponding interventions required to deviate individuals from this pathway, which often follows the same sequence of events. For example - the presence of ACEs increases an individuals' vulnerability; push and/or pull factors lead the individual to go missing which, if increase in frequency and volume, may indicate that the individual is being exploited or involved in crime; the severity of these crimes/exploitation is likely to increase as the individual becomes more established/involved within a group/situation; and this may lead them to becoming the recruiter of other vulnerable individuals into this cycle.


Figure 8: Prevent pathway and associated interventions



In order to break this cycle, reduce the harm and vulnerability, and increase community resilience in areas of concern (where vulnerability and harm is high), the partnership must work as 'one cohesive system.' It must align its structures and establish its membership, tools and focus to effectively manage its assets, share information, ensure governance of issues/problems and provide a co-ordinated response (see figure 9). In order to make effective and informed decisions or assessments, it must also ensure that the practitioner, agency or service has all the information, understanding, tactics, and support they need to address the issue, threat or risk.

The County Strategy Group presents the partnership with an opportunity to set these shared priorities/threats, corral services and commission them together. However, for this capability to be truly effective, this whole-system approach must be adopted at all levels of the partnership (strategic, tactical and practitioner level). Shared strategic priorities must be contextualised and incorporated into the tactical plans of each statutory/non-statutory partner; key processes, forums and functions to support decision making regarding these priorities must be established; and practitioners must be equipped with the tools and knowledge to effectively respond to the threat/issue.

Figure 9: Key components of a Partnership Target Operating Model



7. The SOC Strategy

The SOC Strategy 2018 states that changes are required to strengthen our response to SOC. A greater focus on the most dangerous offenders and the highest harm networks; utilising all available powers and levers against the most determined criminals exploiting vulnerable people; and enhancing our ability to deny criminals and networks access to money, assets and infrastructure, will ensure the targeting of those posing the highest harm. Aligning our efforts to tackle SOC as one cohesive system⁷; improving tasking and governance for law enforcement; exploring a new funding model that can commit investment over multiple years; improving system-wide capability development in data, skills and technology; and building capabilities designed to tackle a range of crime types seek to strengthen the system.

In order to deliver against the revised SOC Strategy 2018, which aims to protect UK citizens and our prosperity by leaving ‘no safe space’ for serious and organised criminals to operate within the UK and overseas, online and offline, the partnership must utilise the framework and capabilities outlined in the strategy, designed to respond to the full range of SOC threats. This framework is detailed in figure 10 below.

⁷ Law enforcement, the whole of government, the private sector and the public.

Figure 10: Framework for tackling SOC



A review conducted by the National Audit Office (NAO) concluded that the SOC Strategy 2013 did not effectively deal with the increasing complexity and scale of SOC. The NAO identified an imbalance of effort, particularly in relation to expenditure on tackling SOC, with 79% of spending being focused on pursue activities and 4% on preventing those from engaging in organised crime. With 46,000 individuals being identified as involved in SOC, effective primary, secondary and tertiary interventions are currently being explored by the Home Office to ensure effective investment in prevent activities and to minimise the future demand posed by SOC. These interventions will rely on effective partnership working to deliver.

The NAO also identified a number of other challenges to be addressed:

- The efforts of those tackling SOC were uncoordinated. This is due to separate and differing approaches to prioritisation and tasking.
- SOC funding is disparate and uncertain. It comes from a variety of sources and annual funding settlements and allocation create uncertainty, hinder effective responses to emerging threats and the development of long term projects.
- Capability gaps - The development of capabilities has been inconsistent, and opportunities have been missed to maximise efficiency. Access to capabilities also depends on organisations knowing which partner hosts what capabilities and a good relationship exists between partners, resulting in inequity of access.
- Accountability and governance arrangements are complex. Senior Responsible Owner responsibilities for strategy implementation do not match their powers and authority, and governance is cluttered. Despite there being some recent consolidation of governance groups, 37 groups to tackle SOC and 59 groups to discuss related topics remain.
- Governance structures are not aligned across agencies, which makes it challenging for information and decisions to flow in a systematic and timely way.

- Data and information gaps - Intelligence and assessment capability for tackling SOC is underdeveloped for many crimes. A lack of access to consistent, high-quality, information makes it difficult to obtain a comprehensive picture of the threat, effective and informed decisions/responses to be made, and the impact of these responses to be measured.

A SOC systems tasking project has been initiated to address some of these challenges. This project seeks to ensure the comprehensive identification of threat and risk from SOC from across police and partner agencies, implement a consistent process for the assessment of risk, and ensure the effective management of the risk to support resource allocation. It will achieve this by designing a common prioritisation mechanism and tasking platform for all agencies to follow.

8. Partnership Progress

The signs, symptoms and vulnerabilities associated with SOC have been increasingly recognised by the partnership in 2018/19. An increased recognition of the presence of ACEs in vulnerable groups that are at increased risk of SOC or becoming involved in SOC, is informing early interventions that are seeking to reduce the impact of SOC across public, private and voluntary sector services.

The prevalence and importance of identifying ACEs has also introduced trauma informed practices, and improved the operational response to SOC and associated vulnerabilities, by implementing and extending new and existing processes and tactical activities. These include; the adoption of Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) frameworks for non-OCG threats, LRO workshops to ensure consistency across 4P management plans, the monitoring and management of repeat missing children, the piloting of a robust lifetime offender management programme, and periodic intensification activity to disrupt dynamic and persistent threats, such as County Lines.

The force has also exploited opportunities to identify its hidden SOC demand through initiatives and projects such as Aidant, and has continued to increase its partnership engagement through internal and external conferences⁸. These proactive activities are likely to have contributed to a 55% increase (42 to 65) in OCG disruptions in 2018. A 29% increase in MDSHT and reduction in children flagged as 'at risk' of CSE in 2018 also evidences the partnerships progress in identifying those exhibiting these 'hidden' vulnerabilities.

In order to co-ordinate its response to SOC, the force has adopted the three 'pillars' of response. This groups SOC threats into three broad categories; those which target people's vulnerabilities, are motivated by prosperity or involve commodities. In 2018/19 the partnership has taken steps to improve and enhance its understanding and response to these threats.

The force has also been working alongside SERCO and the Home Office to introduce and establish a single, 'whole-system' approach to disrupting high harm OCGs. This approach seeks to ensure Hampshire remains a hostile environment for OCG activity and undermines OCG business models so they are less able to operate effectively. In order to achieve this, the force has recognised that a community perspective approach must be adopted. This will ensure integrated aims and objectives are determined through a shared understanding of the context, an accurate assessment of capability is achieved and a co-ordinated and combined service response is delivered by the partnership.

In 2019 the force implemented a 'Prosperity Group'. The aim of this group is to understand the current threat that *cyber-crime, fraud and money laundering/illicit finances* has across Hampshire and the IOW to coordinate the delivery of the response to minimise the impact on victims, businesses and public sector organisation, and pursue those involved in the criminality and exploitation associated.

⁸ SOC Partnership Conference & GP's Conference in 2018.



The individuals and networks involved in SOC have been described as the most capable and resilient adversaries that the UK faces⁹. They take various forms and structures, operate in changing and unpredictable ways across local and international borders, are enabled by and exploit technology, and target vulnerabilities. This has enabled them to become adaptable, resilient and networked.

⁹ SOC Strategy 2018.

